The balance of power in the spy world is shifting; closed societies now have the edge over open ones. Technical prowess is also shifting. Much like manned spaceflight, human-based intelligence is starting to look costly and anachronistic. Meanwhile, a gulf is growing between the cryptographic superpowers—the United States, United Kingdom, France, Israel, China, and Russia—and everyone else. Technical expertise, rather than human sleuthing, will hold the key to future success.
In another major change, the boundaries between public and private sector intelligence work are becoming increasingly blurred. Private contractors have become an essential part of the spy world.
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Today, intelligence officers regularly move into the private sector once they leave government. That shift has allowed some ex-spies to get extremely rich, but it is also eroding the mystique—and the integrity—of the dark arts practiced in the service of the state. Finally, intelligence agencies in democratic countries no longer enjoy the legitimacy bequeathed on them in the past or the glamor that rubbed off from Hollywood and spy fiction.
Public skepticism about the means and aims of a potentially money-grubbing, thuggish, and self-interested caste of spooks has grown. Spymasters increasingly have to justify what they do and accept unprecedented levels of legislative and judicial scrutiny. The biggest disruptive force is technological. Traditional spycraft has always relied on deception based on identity. Spotting, developing, recruiting, running, and servicing intelligence sources involves concealing what you are doing.
Once an adversary learns that an intelligence operation is underway, he or she can use it to discover more clues or feed you false or tainted information. Traditionally, spies depended on cover identities. Until a few years ago, a visiting Canadian in Moscow who claimed to be a graduate student in architecture could present a cover that would be difficult for Russian counterintelligence officers to crack.
They could check her documents, grill her about her background, search her possessions, or follow her. They could even use a gifted individual with a photographic memory for faces to scour books full of pictures of known or suspected intelligence officers. But if none of those avenues produced any clues, all they could do was watch, wait, and see if the suspect made a mistake. Not anymore.
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A cover identity that would have been almost bulletproof only 20 years ago can now be unraveled in a few minutes. For a start, facial recognition software—mostly developed by Israeli companies and widely deployed in China and elsewhere—allows governments and law enforcement agencies to store and search vast numbers of faces.
They can then cross-check such data with the slew of personal information that most people voluntarily and habitually upload online. Counterintelligence officers start with the internet. Has their target appeared in any photo anywhere? Then they use CCTV, gathered at home and from systems run by allies.
If the Canadian architecture student does not appear in any social media linked to the Canadian university where she claims to have studied, her story starts to look shaky. It looks even worse if she can be seen on holiday in Hong Kong three years ago, socializing with U.
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The most crucial element of the technological storm engulfing intelligence agencies is the mobile phone. This device not only records your communications once hacked—phone calls and messages received and sent—it also acts as a tracking beacon. It can easily be attacked to become even more intrusive. Given a minute of hands-on access, an adversary can make sure that the microphone is turned permanently on and that the phone continues transmitting even when the owner believes it to be switched off.
The same malware can be installed by sending a text message. But doing so creates an even bigger danger. In the case of the Canadian graduate student, having searched for her likeness online, a Russian counterintelligence investigator would then look at her phone data. Most people seek to keep whatever phone number they first acquired even as they change devices. These might include stops on park benches, trips to obscure suburbs, or disappearances into the Moscow Metro during which the subject switched off her phone for hours.
Investigators can also combine these two tactics with a third: financial information. What plastic cards does she carry? Does her purchasing history and behavior match her cover story? Every one of these questions is revealing if answered and devastating if not. There are, after all, very few people who travel abroad without a bank account or credit rating, with no social media history, and a prepaid burner phone—and those who do tend to have something to hide.
Intelligence agencies have several ways of addressing these technological problems. This technique starts with false names, documents, and addresses—the traditional stock in trade of the spy world—but with a digital twist. Today, spies can rely on a LinkedIn entry, a plain vanilla credit rating, or a dormant Facebook account, all with enough detail to be plausible but with too little distinctive material to make a serious check possible.
A third option is to treat identities as disposable—sending intelligence officers on one-off missions, knowing that afterward they will be burned forever. A fourth is to conduct espionage only in neutral or friendly environments: You still spy on the Russians or the Chinese but from London or Paris rather than Moscow or Beijing. None of these approaches is ideal. Either the risks and costs are high or the benefits are low—or both.
Meanwhile old staples of spycraft no longer work due to technological advances. Until recently, the dead-letter box was regarded as all but foolproof, an ideal location that both a source and a collection officer could plausibly visit—a bench in a cemetery for example. One party would leave behind some intelligence material, perhaps stored on a tiny memory card enclosed in chewing gum. The other party would then collect it. Even a team of experienced observers would struggle to see what was really going on.
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Today such tactics rarely work. It is easy for Russian counterintelligence to track the movements of every mobile phone in Moscow, so if the Canadian is carrying her device, observers can match her movements with any location that looks like a potential site for a dead drop.
They could then look at any other phone signal that pings in the same location in the same time window. If the visitor turns out to be a Russian government official, he or she will have some explaining to do. Electronic communications have grown equally vulnerable. When interviewing an applicant for a sales position, see if they ask the type of questions that show they're already thinking about what it will take to make it in the job.
Money-motivation is such an important trait in sales that I've seen some companies go as far as to ask sales candidates to submit previous W-2s so they can prove they've been able to earn the type of money they would like to bring in now. A truly money-motivated person wouldn't hesitate to turn them in. They're already focused on going beyond your quota to earn the type of money they want to make. Entrepreneur Media, Inc. In order to understand how people use our site generally, and to create more valuable experiences for you, we may collect data about your use of this site both directly and through our partners.
Next Article -- shares Add to Queue. Suzanne Paling. October 21, 4 min read. Surveillance footage published by Turkish newspaper Hurriyet purports to show Jamal Khashoggi entering the Saudi consulate in Istanbul on October 2. Khashoggi met his Turkish fiancee, Hatice Cengiz, who is 23 years his junior, in May at a conference in Istanbul, according to Cengiz and a close friend of the Saudi journalist. Their relationship quickly evolved, and Khashoggi spoke about wanting to start a new life with her. By August, the couple had decided to marry in Turkey, where Cengiz lived, and spend much of their time there.
The decision to marry in Istanbul, whose mosques reminded Khashoggi of his hometown Medina, set off a paper chase that ultimately ended in Khashoggi's disappearance. Turkish law required that Khashoggi, who was divorced, provide proof that he did not have a wife. He asked if he could get the document from the Saudi embassy in Washington, according to a friend in Europe, but was told the consulate in Turkey was better placed to help. Cengiz said Khashoggi wouldn't have applied for the document in Istanbul if he could have avoided it. Asked to comment, a Saudi official said it was "not accurate" that Khashoggi was told to go to Istanbul.
The friend recounted how he warned Khashoggi against getting the paper in Istanbul for fear the Saudis might arrest him if he set foot in the consulate. Khashoggi reassured him, he said, that his good connections in Turkey meant "no one can do anything to harm me in Istanbul. Khashoggi visited the consulate without an appointment on Friday, Sept Cengiz waited outside. That first meeting went smoothly. Khashoggi told Cengiz and several friends that officials in the consulate had treated him politely. They explained the paperwork would take time to prepare.
Khashoggi exchanged phone numbers with a consulate official named Sultan so he could call and check on progress, according to three friends. Sultan said the document would be ready early the following week. Reuters has not been able to locate Sultan or confirm his role at the consulate. The consul declined to comment on who Khashoggi spoke to. He told me 'inshallah God willing I will receive this paper after I come back from London,'" Cengiz said. Confident he would soon have the paperwork he needed, Khashoggi flew to London later the same day to attend a conference.
He was asked there by colleagues about the threat he faced from the Saudi authorities for his work, according to some of those present. An exiled Saudi dissident who spoke to Khashoggi in the days before his disappearance, said his friend was worried that he might face interrogation by the Saudis, but nothing more. Another friend, British-Palestinian activist Azzam Tamimi, who saw Khashoggi during that trip to London, said he "didn't seem scared at all. The opposite. He was relaxed and calm. Jamal Khashoggi disappeared after entering the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in early October.
Khashoggi flew back to Istanbul from London on Monday evening, Oct 1. The following morning, he spoke again with consul worker Sultan, who told him to collect the document at 1 p.
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Outside the consulate, a low rise building at the edge of one of Istanbul's business districts, Khashoggi handed Cengiz his two mobile phones, the fiancee told Reuters. He left instructions that she should call Aktay, the Erdogan aide, if he didn't reappear. Khashoggi was wearing his black Apple Watch, connected to one of the phones, when he entered the building.
A senior Turkish government official and a senior security official said the two inter-connected devices are at the heart of the investigation into Khashoggi's disappearance. Investigators are trying to determine what information the watch transmitted. Turkey does not have the watch so we are trying to do it through connected devices," he said. Tech experts say an Apple Watch can provide data such as location and heart rate. But what investigators can find out depends on the model of watch, whether it was connected to the internet, and whether it is near enough an iPhone to synchronize.
When Khashoggi did not emerge quickly, Cengiz said she at first hoped he had got the document and was talking with consul staff. She called Aktay, the Erdogan aide, around 4. As soon as he received the call, Aktay told Reuters, he contacted Turkish security forces and intelligence officials.
And of course then, a long period of tension and expectation started.